Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this paper examines why China developed an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) but did not deploy it. ERWs, better known as "neutron bombs," are specialized nuclear weapons with reduced blast effects and enhanced radiation, making them ideal tactical and antipersonnel weapons. Declassified U.S. intelligence and Chinese press reports indicate the People's Republic of China (PRC) was interested in an ERW in 1977 and successfully tested a device on September 29, 1988. To date, however, these sources provide no evidence of deployment. This study exploits primary source documents to reconstruct the ERW program's history, assesses drivers behind decisions throughout the program, and considers broader implications for PRC decisionmaking on weapons development. This case study suggests a model of a "technology reserve" in which China develops a weapons technology to match the capabilities of another state but defers deployment. This paper presents an analytic framework for examining how the technology reserve model might apply to China's decisionmaking on ballistic missile defense (BMD), antisatellite (ASAT), and hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) systems.China's nuclear force modernization and its lack of transparency have long been of interest to U.S. policymakers and analysts. One of the most opaque and debated aspects of this discussion is China's tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), or nuclear weapons designed to be used on a battlefield. Enhanced radiation weapons (ERWs), better known as "neutron bombs," are specialized TNWs with reduced blast effects and enhanced radiation, making them ideal tactical and antipersonnel weapons. Current literature on China's ERW is limited, but one author claims Chinese leaders have expressed "an unusual degree of fascination with" ERWs. Declassified U.S. intelligence and Chinese press reports indicate the People's Republic of China (PRC) was interested in an ERW in 1977 and successfully tested a device on September 29, 1988. To date, however, these sources provide no evidence of deployment. This study reconstructs the ERW program's history by exploiting primary source documents, and it considers the implications for analyses of PRC weapons development, including contemporary systems of concern.Analytic Framework and Variables * Case Study: Red China's Capitalist Bomb * Analysis and Implications for Today * Toward a "Technology Reserve" Model: Match Capabilities but Defer Deployment * Conclusions and Areas for Future Analysis